In this paper Dr Stahl proposes an account of social practice in which the mutual ascription of normative authority between participants (“recognition”) is the most fundamental element.
Some contemporary legal positivists explain the existence of legal facts by reference to social practices that are characterized by shared plans or joint commitments. Dr Stahl argues that any account of social practice that attempts to explain the existence of law must make it intelligible how members of such a practice can take one another to be entitled to criticize each other's behaviour. None of the social practice accounts that have been presented so far succeeds in this task, either because they remain individualist or because they impose implausible requirements on members of social practices. Dr Stahl proposes an account of social practice in which the mutual ascription of normative authority between participants (“recognition”) is the most fundamental element. This account can make the feature of intersubjective criticism intelligible and correctly captures central elements of legal practices.
Titus Stahl is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Frankfurt and Macquarie University Sydney in 2010 for a thesis on immanent critique (scheduled to appear in English translation with Rowman and Littlefield in 2019). His areas of research are social and political philosophy, critical theory (in particular, the Frankfurt School and Western Marxism), social ontology, the philosophy of hope and privacy theory.
More information on Dr Titus Stahl can be found here.
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